Demographic Change and Economic Growth in India by Jain, Neha & Goli, Srinivas
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Demographic Change and Economic
Growth in India
Jain, Neha and Goli, Srinivas
15 February 2021
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/109560/
MPRA Paper No. 109560, posted 04 Sep 2021 12:40 UTC
1 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN INDIA 
 
Neha Jain1 and Srinivas Goli2,3 
 
 
1. Research Scholar at Centre for the Study of Regional Development (CSRD), School of Social 




2. Australia India Institute, New Generation Network Scholar, The University of Western Australia 
(UWA) 
3. Assistant Professor, Population Studies at Centre for the Study of Regional Development (CSRD), 
School of Social Sciences (SSS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi India 




























Demographic Change and Economic Growth in India 
 
Abstract  
In this paper, we assess the economic benefits of demographic changes in India by employing econometric models 
and robustness checks based on panel data gathered over a period of more than three decades. Our analysis 
highlights four key points. First, the contribution of India’s demographic dividend is estimated to be around 1.9 
percentage points out of 12% average annual growth rate in per capita income during 1981–2015. Second, India’s 
demographic window of opportunity began in 2005, significantly improved after 2011, and will continue till 2061. 
Third, our empirical analysis supports the argument that the realisation of the demographic dividend is conditional 
on a conducive policy environment with enabling aspects such as quality education, good healthcare, decent 
employment opportunities, good infrastructure, and gender empowerment. Fourth, the working-age population in 
India contributes around one-fourth of the inequality in per capita income across states. Thus, to reap the maximum 
dividends from the available demographic window of opportunity, India needs to work towards enhancing the 
quality of education and healthcare in addition to providing good infrastructure, gender empowerment, and decent 
employment opportunities for the growing working-age population.  
 
Keywords: Demographic Dividend, Economic Growth, Population Growth, Working-Age Population, Health, 
Education, Employment 








• The contribution of India’s demographic dividend is estimated to be around 1.9 percentage points 
out of 12% average annual growth rate in per capita income during 1981–2015. 
• India’s working-age population contributes around 25% of the inequality in per capita income 
across states. 
• India’s demographic window of opportunity began in 2005 and will continue till 2061.  
• The realisation of India’s demographic dividend is conditional on a conducive policy environment 
in the country.  
• Education and health, employment, infrastructure, and gender empowerment are defining 





Falling fertility rates globally in the last two decades have created massive opportunities for developing 
countries as they are now in a position to reap the benefits of demographic changes and the consequent 
shift in age-structural transition. At the country level, India is also completing its fertility transition 
(reaching the replacement level fertility of 2.1 children per woman) in 2020 (Office of RGI, 2020). India 
entered a phase that can be aptly termed a ‘demographic window of opportunities’ in 2005–06 and will 
likely have a demographic bonus till 2055. The country is on the cusp of a demographic revolution with 
the rapidly rising share of the working-age population that was approximately 58% in 2000 and is 
estimated to reach a maximum of 65% in 2036. Further, India’s demographic dividend window is available 
for a longer period than for any other country because of the huge inter-state variations in the process of 
demographic transition. Some states in southern and western India will find the closing of their 
demographic dividend phase in next few years owing to an early decline in fertility levels, while the 
window of opportunity is yet to commence in high-fertility states such as Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya 
Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh (UNFPA, 2019). 
In 2020, the average age of the Indian population is 29 years, while in other countries such as the USA, 
Europe, and Japan, it is 40 years, 46 years, and 47 years, respectively (National Policy for Skill Development 
and Entrepreneurship Report, 2015). India’s population—one of the youngest among the large nations of 
the world—is projected to have a potential growth-inducing impact on the economy (Aiyar & Mody, 2011; 
Bloom, 2011; Chandrasekhar, Ghosh, & Roychowdhury, 2006; James, 2008; Joe, Kumar, & Rajpal, 2018; 
Lee & Mason, 2006; Kumar, 2013; Ladusingh & Narayana, 2011; Mason, 2005).  
Although a few studies have estimated demographic dividend for India in the past (Acharya, 2004; Aiyar 
& Mody, 2011; Bloom, 2011; Chandrasekhar et al., 2006; Desai, 2010; Goli & Pandey, 2010; James, 2008, 
2011; James & Goli, 2016; Joe et al., 2018; Kumar, 2013; Mitra & Nagarajan, 2005; Navaneetham, 2002; 
Thakur, 2012), all of them have assessed the database that belong to years before the country reached to 
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favourable demographic phase. Considering, the country’s present demographic scenario, and population 
and economic policy interests, there is a strong need for informing the level and pathways for reaping 
demographic dividend in India. It is in this context, the focus of this paper is to estimate the impact of 
demographic factors on economic growth in India. The main objective of this paper is to answer the 
following three questions: (a) What is the estimate of the demographic dividend for India? (b) How far 
India’s capacity to reap demographic dividend is conditional on the policy environment of Indian states 
such as good health, quality education, decent employment opportunities, and gender empowerment? 
(c) How much of the inter-state inequality in economic development is explained by their working-age 
population share across states? 
This paper adds to the literature by attempting a robust and comprehensive assessment of demographic 
change and its economic implications for India through the following four ways: First, it measures the 
demographic dividend based on the panel dataset of twenty-five states of India for the period 1981–2015 
by using conditional Barro regression model under which core policy variables are controlled to estimate 
a net demographic effect. Secondly, it provides a glimpse of the onset of demographic window of 
opportunity for the country by systematically examining the influence of the demographic changes on per 
capita income across different decades 1991–95, 2001–05 and 2011–15. Third, we cautiously check for 
the interaction of demographic changes with the health, education, employment, and gender 
empowerment measures to ascertain two aspects: (i) to check whether the positive effects of 
demographic changes on economic growth are conditioned on the policy environment of the country; (ii) 
to identify the mechanisms that determine reaping of demographic dividend. Lastly, three robustness 
checks are performed. First, by comparing our estimates of demographic dividend with other previously 
existing studies. Secondly, the role of the working-age population in the growing income inequality across 
Indian states has been checked by using the Regression-Based Inequality Decomposition Model. This 
model is a significant contribution to the eco-demographic literature which in our knowledge has not been 
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attempted by any other study. Third, endogeneity of the working-age share is assessed using an 
instrumental variable model (two-stage least squares model). 
The summary of the findings is as follows: (i) the contribution of the demographic dividend is estimated 
to be around 1.9 percentage points out of the 12% average annual growth rate in per capita NSDP during 
1981–2015; (ii) India’s demographic window of opportunity has begun in 2005 and significantly improving 
after 2011 and will continue till 2061; (iii) the working-age population explains around one-fourth of the 
inequality in per capita income across states over time; (iv) better education and health, decent 
employment opportunities, good infrastructure, and lower gender-bias are defining factors of India’s 
demographic dividend.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on the demographic 
dividend. Section 3 discusses stylised facts on India’s demographic transition, consequent age-structure 
change and emergence of windows of opportunity. Section 4 deals with empirical strategy, including the 
data and descriptive statistics, empirical specifications, and estimation results (both main results and 
robustness checks). Section 5 deals with the challenges in the way of realising demographic dividend, and 
Section 6 presents the conclusions.  
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Concept of demographic dividend 
The impact of demographic factors, mainly population size and its growth, on economic development has 
long been represented by three major contesting views in the literature—the pessimistic theory, the 
optimistic theory, and the neutralist theory (Birdsall, Kelly, & Sinding, 2003; Coale & Hoover, 1958). 
However, these growth debates have ignored the effect of changes in age structure on economic 
performance. It is only after the late 1980s and particularly the late 1990s that the significance of age 
structure and the resulting emergence of ‘demographic bonus’ was acknowledged in the literature (Bloom 
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& Freeman, 1988; Bloom & Sachs, 1998; Bloom & Williamson, 1998; Bloom, Canning & Sevilla, 2001; 
Higgins & Williamson, 1997; Mason, 2001). 
The concepts of ‘demographic bonus’ or ‘demographic dividend’ emanates when an economy moves from 
the second stage to the third stage of the demographic transition process in which birth rates begin to 
fall, coupled with a falling death rate, and leads to a subsequent shift in the age structure of the population 
towards working-age group (15–59) relative to the population of dependents (0–14 and 60+). Among the 
dependents, the child population falls dramatically while that of the old-age population grows only 
moderately, thereby creating opportunities for growth (Bloom, et al., 2003; Bloom, 2011).  
The rising share of working-age population creates a potential for many benefits. First, it increases the 
labour force who produce more than they consume. Second, lower fertility rate induces greater 
participation of females in the labour market. Third, investment becomes more in health, education and 
skills of the population as lower resources are needed to be diverted for child caring and rearing. Fourth, 
household savings increase as working-age people are more capable of saving than the dependents and 
accord capital for investment purposes. The fifth argument follows from the ‘life-cycle hypothesis’ which 
states that people in the working-age save more for their retirement due to improvements in life 
expectancy (Bloom et al., 2003; Bloom, 2011). However, the realisation of demographic dividend is 
conditional on existing policy environment such as investments in various sectors (namely, education, 
skills and health), growing employment opportunities for a rapidly growing young population, flexible 
labour market, good governance, efficient infrastructure, well developed financial market, family 
planning, trade openness, efficient fiscal and macro-economic management. Moreover, this dividend is 
transitory in nature and vanishes over time with further demographic changes (Bloom et al., 2003; Bloom 





2.2 Demographic dividend: the Global context 
The interest in demographic dividend began with the developing countries—especially the Asian 
countries—as they were having a relatively higher population and started experiencing a fertility decline. 
The transition occurred first in Japan among all the Asian countries, starting around 1964 and lasting till 
2004. Subsequently, the East and Southeast Asian countries began to reap the advantages of demographic 
dividend. It was estimated that nearly one-third of the economic growth of East Asian countries between 
1960 and 2010 could be due to demographic dividend (Bloom & Williamson, 1998; Bloom, Canning, & 
Malaney, 2000; Bloom & Canning, 2004; Bloom & Finlay, 2008; Mason, 2001). Similarly, Kelly & Schmidt 
(2005) also found that around 20% of the per capita income growth in a cross country panel of 86 countries 
over the period 1960–1995 could be attributed to demographic changes, with around 28% share of Asian 
countries (including India). A study by Bloom & Canning (2003) highlighted the significance of the right 
economic policy framework in realising dividend. For instance, the legalisation of contraception in Ireland 
resulted in a sharp fall in fertility and led to a rise in the relative share of the working-age population. 
Besides, favourable policy environment through the promotion of exports and free secondary education 
along with demographic shift could explain a major part of Ireland’s remarkable economic growth of the 
1990s, making it the “Irish Tiger”.  
On the other hand, the slow fertility transition and lack of effective policy environment in Africa could 
describe the poor economic growth of African countries (Bloom et al., 2003; Bloom and Sachs, 1998; 
Bloom, Canning, Fink, and Finlay, 2007; Bloom, Canning, Hu et al., 2010). The study by Navaneetham 
(2002) also found demographic dividend in all Southeast Asian countries except for the Philippines, which 
suffers from lack of openness to trade and limited human capital formation. Similarly, Latin America could 
not take advantage of its favourable demographic changes due to a rigid labour market, weak governance 
and a lack of openness to trade (Bloom, Canning, Evans, et al. 1999). Therefore, changing age structure 
accompanied by right policy environment are quintessential, otherwise, it may result in rising 
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unemployment, higher crime rates and political instability (Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Bloom et al., 
2003). 
 
2.3 Demographic dividend: the Indian context 
Akin to global literature, there are both optimistic and pessimistic views on India’s potential of realising 
the demographic dividend. In the Indian context, studies by Acharya (2004); Chandrasekhar et al. (2006); 
Desai (2010); Goli & Pandey (2010); James (2011) and James & Goli (2016); Mitra & Nagarajan (2005); 
Bloom (2011) have theoretically argued that demographic windows of opportunity alone cannot bring 
about an impetus to growth in the country. The demographic windows of opportunity just creates a 
supply-side potential and cannot be realised unless the growing working-age population’s skills have been 
enhanced and accommodated in employment.  
The studies by Bloom & Williamson (1998); Bloom & Canning (2004); Bloom et al., (2007); Bloom & Finlay 
(2008); Bloom et al., (2010); Bloom, Finlay, Humair et al., (2015) and Kelly & Schmidt (2005) have 
empirically estimated windows of opportunity for a global sample of countries, including India, covering 
various years from 1960 to the closest year 2005 by taking either a 5- or a 10-year panel. However, these 
studies have estimated demographic dividend for India before the onset of windows of opportunity for 
India. Also, these studies have not exploited inter-state differences in the stages of demographic transition 
in India, thereby providing just an all India average estimate for the demographic dividend.  
The study by James (2008) used state-level data for 15 major states in India by constructing a decadal 
panel for the period 1971–2001. The study found a powerful positive impact of working-age population 
share on economic growth, despite lacunae in education, health and employment generation, by using 
the 2SLS method to control for potential possible reverse causality. Another study by Aiyar and Mody 
(2011) undertook the analysis for the period 1961–2001 for 22 states of India. It found that around 40%–
50% of the per capita income growth in India since the 1970s is due to the demographic dividend after 
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correcting for inter-state migration and using a two-stage procedure to check for endogeneity issue. But 
unlike previous studies, this study did not find demographic dividend to be dependent on policy 
environment. The study by Thakur (2012), however, made a departure from previous studies and found a 
negative impact of growth in the working-age ratio on economic growth for the period 1981–2011 for 17 
major states of India. The study supported its argument on account of the absence of appropriate policies 
and institutions in the backward states experiencing a major rise in the share of working-age population. 
Kumar (2013) study found favourable demographic impact for the period 1971–2001 for 17 major states 
of India but remained sceptical about future growth prospects for India due to the major share of the rise 
in the working-age population in the economically weaker states which have poor infrastructure and a 
dearth of proper policies to absorb the growing workforce.  More recently, the study by Joe et al. (2018) 
used state-level panel data from 1980 to 2010 for 15 states of India and found no significant impact of 
growth in the share of the working-age population on the per capita income growth but could not control 
for several key policy variables.  
Summing up, the empirical estimation of demographic dividend in India suffers from at least three 
limitations. First, all of the previous studies have analysed demographic dividend before the country 
reached a favourable demographic phase. In this study, we hypothesis the impact of demographic divided 
is different at different stages of demographic transition. Thus, the estimation of demographic divided 
after onset of window of opportunity assumes greater importance.  Second, no previous study has 
empirically checked for the interaction effects of demographic changes with core policy variables to 
explore the underlying mechanisms leading to demographic dividend and also to estimate the net 
demographic effect on economic growth of India. Third, also for the first time, this study estimates the 
contribution of demographic differences to inequality in per capita income across the states. Fourth, the 




3 Demographic transition, age-structure change, and window of opportunity  
An analysis of India’s population since 1950 reveals that it has risen tremendously and is estimated to rise 
further to reach 1.7 billion people by 2060 but after this, a downfall in population size is projected (Fig. 
1). The trends in the exponential growth rate of the population at all India level displays an inverted U-
shaped pattern with continuously falling population growth rate recorded since 1990–91. The exponential 
growth rate of the population will become negative for the period after 2060 due to a fall in population 
size (Fig. 2). This pattern of decreasing exponential growth rate of population is also discernible in all the 
states of India, except for Tamil Nadu where the growth rate of population is small and the present 
increase in its population growth is mainly attributed to its inward migration (Fig. 3). Therefore, to 
comprehend this eccentric pattern of demographic change in India, one has to delve into the underlying 
forces of fertility and mortality (James, 2011; James & Goli, 2016). 




















































































































































Fig. 1. Trends in population size (in millions) in India (1950–2100) 
Source: World Population Prospects (19th Revision), United Nations 2019 
Fig. 2. Trends in exponential growth rate (in percentage) of population in India  
 
Source: Census of India, Office of the Registrar General of India 
Fig. 3. Trends in exponential growth rate (in percentage) across major states of India 
 
The trends in population health parameters such as mortality rate, fertility rate, and life expectancy at 































































































































































































































































































too, particularly in demographically laggard states (James & Goli, 2016). The mortality rate captured by 
Infant mortality rate (IMR) has gone down from 181 per 1,000 live births in 1950 to 32 per 1,000 live births 
in 2020, and UN Projections (2019) suggest that it is estimated to reach 5 by the end of this century. The 
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) has fallen from 5.9 children per woman in 1950 to 2.2 children per woman in 
2020, almost touching the replacement level fertility of 2.1 children per woman. According to UN 
Projections (2019), the TFR will stabilise at 1.7 children per woman after 2050. India’s average life 
expectancy at birth (LEB) has risen from just 37 years in the post-independence period to 70 years in 2020 
and is projected to reach 81 years by the end of this century. All these population parameters have 
important implications for the age structure transition of India’s population. 
Source: Authors’ estimates from various rounds of sample registration system 
Fig. 4. Trends in IMR, LEB, and TFR  
 
The age structure transition of the Indian population (1951–2100) reveals (see Fig. 5) that the size of the 
child population (0–14 years) is continuously falling whereas the share of the older-age population (above 
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age population will go up from 5.7% in 2000 to 33.2% in 2100, surpassing the estimated child population. 
Even the working-age population will continue to increase till 2035 and experience a downfall thereafter. 
Source: World Population Prospects (19th Revision), United Nations 2019 
Fig. 5. Age—Composition of India’s population (1951–2100) 
 
Further, the trends in the share of the working-age population across different states of India (Fig. 6) 
highlight that the share of the working-age population is rising across all the states of India (except for 
Meghalaya). But there is heterogeneity in its share with the proportion ranging between 55% for Bihar to 
69.5% for Manipur in 2011. There is a phenomenal increase in the working-age share in the Manipur 
(around 19%) followed by around 10% rise in the southern states (except Tamil Nadu), Haryana, Himachal 
Pradesh, Punjab, Tripura, Sikkim, Maharashtra and West Bengal over the last three decades while 
northern and central Indian states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh have seen a 
smaller rise in its share. This implies that these states where the fertility rate is still moderately high will 

















































































































































Source: Census of India, Office of the Registrar General India 
Fig. 6. Trends in working-age population share across Indian states  
 
4 Empirical strategy 
4.1 Data and variables description 
This study compiles data from widely acceptable and reliable sources for 25 states of India1 for four 
different periods—1981–85, 1991–95, 2001–05, and 2011–2015. A stacked time-series balanced panel 
data is constructed for 25 states and 4 time points (25*4) having a total of 100 cases. The study variables 
are grouped into outcome variable, predictor variables, and covariates. The per capita net state domestic 
product (NSDP) at factor cost (1981 to 2015) obtained from the Central Statistics Organisation (indexed 
to 2011–12 constant prices) is the outcome variable. The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 shows 
that the average per capita NSDP is Rupees 51,333 with its minimum value ranging from 9,618 to 
 
1 Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Delhi, 










































































































































































































maximum value 2,78,601, demonstrating glaring disparities in per capita income across states over time.  
The working-age population ratio (15–59 years), both level and growth, (1981–2011) in percentage terms 
is considered as the main predictor variable of economic growth taken from the Census of India. It varies 
from 50.3 to 69.5% across states over time (1981–2011). Besides, other covariates of economic growth 
are taken to have a net demographic dividend. These are urbanisation, social sector expenditure, 
governance index, gender development index, gender empowerment measure, education institutional 
resources, share of agriculture to non-agriculture, export openness index, infrastructure index, IMR, 
graduate share and workforce participation rate (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics and data source).  
A more detailed description of the covariates indicates their rationale of inclusion in the regressions. First 
of all, the level of urbanisation  rate is highly correlated with economic growth as it offers economies of 
scale, better employment opportunities, good education and health facilities, higher productivity, and 
induces lower fertility rates and, hence, higher participation of females in the labour market (Bloom et al., 
2003; Bloom, Canning, and Fink, 2008; Bloom, 2011). India is also experiencing a fast pace of urbanisation 
rate, expanding from 28.5% in 2001 (Census, 2001) to 34% in the year 2018 (U.N. World Urbanisation 
Prospects, 2018). Hence, it is an important covariate which no previous study in our knowledge has 
incorporated so far.  
Investments in human capital, in the form of education and health, reflects the quality of labour. It was 
one of the most essential policy intervention in East Asia which helped in its ‘economic miracle’ (Bloom et 
al., 2003; Bloom, 2011). To capture this, we have taken both input and output indicators of human capital. 
The social sector expenditure by the government on education and health and the availability of education 
institutional resources reflect input side of human capital formation while infant mortality rate and 
graduate share indicate health and education status respectively of a nation.  
Further, realisation of dividend comes from the removal of gender bias and empowerment of the females, 
that is, more participation of females in the labour market, in the political sphere, and in the decision 
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making, presence of more healthy and educated women, and their control over economic resources 
(Bloom et al., 2007; Bloom, 2011). To control it, the gender development index and gender empowerment 
measure are considered. 
Next, the quality of institutions reflecting good governance increases a nation’s capacity to absorb 
growing labour force (Bloom & Williamson, 1998; Bloom et al., 1999; Bloom & Canning, 2004; Bloom et 
al., 2007; Bloom & Finlay, 2008; Bloom et al., 2010; Bloom et al., 2015). To control the quality of 
institutions, we have taken a state-level governance index. 
The share of agriculture to non-agriculture is also controlled as it reflects the structural changes in 
employment in an economy. A lower share of people engaged in the agriculture sector relative to the non-
agriculture sector indicates productivity gain because the agriculture sector has lower productivity as 
compared to the non-agriculture sector (Bloom et al., 2010).  
The availability of efficient physical infrastructures such as roads, rail, power and postal service is essential 
to capitalise dividend as it will attract new investment and generate additional employment opportunities 
(Bloom, 2011; Kumar, 2013). Therefore, an infrastructure index is computed to control it. Another 
important correlate of economic growth is the openness to trade (Bloom & Williamson, 1998; Bloom et 
al., 1999; Bloom et al., 2003; Bloom & Canning, 2004; Bloom et al., 2007; Bloom & Finlay, 2008; Bloom et 
al., 2010; Bloom et al., 2015). It is considered by taking the export openness of a state. Lastly, the healthy, 
educated and large working-age population alone cannot increase economic growth until provided with 
gainful and decent employment opportunities. Bloom & Williamson (1998) also suggested to take growth 
in employment rather than the growth of the working-age population to get a real demographic dividend. 
Hence, we have included the workforce participation rate to see its direct effects on economic growth. 
The appendix Table A1 shows the correlation matrix for the pooled sample from 1981 to 2015. It is evident 
from the table that the log of working-age share is highly correlated with log per capita income 
(correlation value is 0.81). Other significant correlates of per capita income are gender empowerment 
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measure, gender development index, graduate share, IMR, level of urbanisation and share of agriculture 
to non-agriculture.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and source of the variables  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Data source Description  
Outcome variable      
Per capita 
income 
51333 45305 9618 278601 
Central Statistical Organization Per capita net state domestic product (NSDP) at 
factor cost (1981 to 2015) (indexed to 2011–12 
constant prices) 
Predictor variable      
Working-age 
ratio  58.4 4.3 50.3 69.5 
Census of India Log of the population aged 15–59 years as a 
percentage of total population 
Covariates       
Urbanisation 27.5 17.2 6.6 97.5 Census of India Proportion of population living in urban areas  
Social sector 
expenditure  11.7 8.0 1.6 52.8 
Goswami and Bezbaruah (2011) and RBI 
handbook of state statistics 
Expenditure on education, healthcare and rural 
development by government as a % of GSDP 
Governance 
index 9.5 4.7 1.0 16.0 
Basu (2002) and Mundle, Chowdhury, and 
Sikdar (2016) 




0.8 0.1 0.2 0.9 
Gendering Human Development Indices: 
Recasting the Gender Development Index 
and Gender Empowerment Measure for 
India (2009) 
Index measuring gender gap in health, knowledge 
and standard of living 
Gender 
empowerment 
measure 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.7 
Same as gender development index Index capturing economic participation, political 
participation and decision making power, and the 




0.2 0.2 0.0 0.8 
Selected educational statistics, MHRD 
2007, and Department of Higher Education, 
MHRD & DISE, NUEPA (School Education 
since 2012–13) 
Index measuring availability of education 
institutional resources based on the total number 
of universities, polytechnics and schools  
Agriculture/ 
non-agriculture 1.5 0.9 0.0 3.8 
NSSO Employment–Unemployment Survey Proportion of people employed in agriculture 
relative to non-agriculture 
Export openness 
index 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 




0.2 0.2 0.0 0.8 
Report of Tenth Five Year Plan and RBI 
Handbook of State Statistics 
Index based on road density, electricity 
consumption, rail route length, and number of post 
offices  
Infant mortality 
rate 57.7 31.3 7.0 150.0 




4.1 3.2 0.7 19.5 
NSSO Employment–Unemployment Survey Proportion of graduate and post graduate share 
out of total population  
Workforce 
participation 
rate 38.6 6.2 26.7 51.8 
Census of India Workers/population ratio 
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4.2  Empirical specification 
First of all, the decadal impact of the working-age population share on per capita income is assessed by 
using the simple OLS regression model. Then the pooled OLS regression model based on the combined 
sample of 100 observations is run to produce an efficient and consistent parameter estimates of the effect 
of working-age share on per capita income. However, the pooled OLS regression model does not control 
for variables that are not directly observable or measurable across states like cultural factors or variables 
that change over time but not across entities. Hence, the panel data regression model is employed to 
account for these factors. We have modelled F-test for the fixed effect (FE) model, Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for the random effect (RE) model and Hausman test to decide between FE 
and RE. The main equation of interest of the panel data regression model used in this paper is given as:  
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡=α+ 𝛽0 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + +𝛽1𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  +𝛽2𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 +𝛽4 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡+𝛽5 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +𝛽6𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡  +𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡+𝛽10  Log 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ Log 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽11 Log 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 Log 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13 Log 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦(1991 − 95) + 𝛽14 Log 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 ∗𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦(2001 − 05) + 𝛽15 Log 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦(2011 − 15) + 𝑢𝑖+𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                    
(1) 
 
where 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  represents the per capita income of state i in time period t. The impact of 
the main predictor variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  is shown both individually and interacted with the 
health, education, employment, and time dummy factor. Β is the coefficient for independent variables. 𝑢𝑖 
(i = 1….n) is a FE or RE specific to individual state or time period that is not included in the regression. 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
is the error term.    
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In the next stage, to get an estimate of demographic dividend for India, the conditional Barro regression 
model is used. The general equation of Barro conditional regression model is as follows: 𝑔𝑦 =  λ (Xβ + p + 𝑤𝑜 − 𝑦𝑜) + 𝑔𝑤)                                                                                                    
 
The above equation links growth in income per capita (𝑔𝑦) to a range of explanatory variable X that 
determine steady-state labour productivity, the initial level of income per capita 𝑦𝑜, and the ratio of 
working-age to the total population 𝑤𝑜  and its growth rate 𝑔𝑤. The constant term captures the 
participation rate p. The conditional Barro regression model used in this paper is extended to include 
significant interactions of growth in working-age ratio with health, education, employment, and gender 
empowerment measure. The statistical expression is given as: 
 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡=α+ 𝛽0 Log 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑖𝑡 +𝛽2 Log 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽3𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +𝛽5 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 +𝛽7𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽8𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +𝛽10𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 Log 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 +𝛽13𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽15 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑖𝑡 ∗Log 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽16 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡   +  𝛽17 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡   +  𝛽18 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  +𝑢𝑖𝑡                                 (2) 
 
where Growth 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  is the annual average growth of per capita net state domestic product in 
state i for the period 1981 to 2015. Similarly, 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑖𝑡  is the growth measured over 
the period 1981-2015. All control variables are measured at the initial period (1981). Rest of the other 
explanatory variables have usual interpretations. 
While the influence of working-age share on per capita income can be assessed by using an alternative 
approach of regression-based inequality decomposition model where the relative contribution of 
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working-age share in inequality in the per capita income across states overtime is computed. This new 
method of establishing the importance of working-age share in determining per capita income is 
presented in the robustness checks at a later stage in the paper. 
We further check for potential endogeneity of the working-age share which may arise from the fact that 
the rise in working-age share just creates a potential labour supply but the actual impact of it on the per 
capita income works through the channels of education, skills, health, employment, gender development 
and availability of infrastructure. Hence, we test the robustness of our results adjusted to the endogeneity 
of working-age share at a later stage in the paper. 
 
4.3 Estimation results 
4.3.1 Impact of working-age share on per capita income 
The models (col. 1, 2, 3) of Table 2 provide simple OLS estimates to assess the impact of the log of working-
age share on per capita income across three different decades 1991–95, 2001–05, and 2011–15. The 
working-age share has a significant bearing on per capita income across all time points and the coefficient 
values are linearly increasing for the successive decades, highlighting the more pronounced effect of 
demographic changes in recent years. This is in line with UNFPA (2019) which argues that India’s 
demographic window of opportunity has begun in 2005–06. 
The R-square of the model also reaches to above 60% in the last two decades, suggesting that goodness 
of the fit of models where demographic changes explain a major proportion of variation in per capita 
income is upright. Moreover, the statistical significance estimate of the working-age share remains stable 
when all the years are pooled together in col. 4. 
 
4.3.2 Panel data regression model with other growth correlates 
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Further specifications of Table 2 include panel data regression model from equation (1) to control for 
variables that are not directly observable or measurable across states and the results highlight that the 
coefficient of the log of working-age share remains statistically significant at 1% level when all other key 
policy variables are controlled in models (col. 5, 6, 7). Among covariates, the urbanisation rate emerges 
to be a significant determinant of per capita income. This is in line with the theoretical argument put 
forward by Bloom et al. (2003) and Bloom (2011). However, these findings are in contrast to the Bloom et 
al. (2008) which found no empirical evidence of linkage between the urbanised population share and 
economic growth. As we said earlier, the relationship between growth correlates and economic growth 
can change over the time. There is a considerable time-lag between Bloom et al. (2008) and this study. 
The gender development index and gender empowerment measure also came out to be statistically 
significant. This implies women’s contribution to economic growth need to be sufficiently understood and 
more policy actions in the areas of education, health and employment need to be enhanced to realise a 
demographic dividend. Similar policy conclusions are also found in the context of African girls in Bloom et 
al. (2003), and Indian women in Bloom (2011) and Desai (2010).  
In col. 8, however, the coefficient for the log of working-age share loses its statistical significance after 
including its interaction with key policy variables and time dummy. The results reveal that the interaction 
of IMR with working-age share is negative and statistically significant which implies that the healthy 
workforce is essential to reap demographic dividend. The finding is in favour of the hypothesis of Bloom 
et al. (2003) and Bloom (2011). It has been proved empirically by Bloom & Williamson (1998); Bloom & 
Canning (2004); Bloom et al. (2007); Bloom & Finlay (2008); Bloom et al. (2015) and Kelly & Schmidt (2005) 
which have taken life expectancy as a proxy indicator for health while Joe, et al. (2018) and Thakur (2012) 
have used IMR to capture the health impact on economic growth.  
We have also tried interacting education and working-age share on the lines of Drummond et al. (2014) 
and Lutz et al. (2019) which found investment in human capital to be an important determinant of 
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demographic dividend. Our interaction term of graduate share and working-age share has expected sign 
but not statistically significant. This statistical insignificance of education term is quite common in growth 
regressions (see Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Bloom & Canning, 2004; Bloom & Finlay, 2008; Bloom et 
al., 2010 and Bloom et al., 2015). This may be due to measurement errors in the education variable or 
may indicate poor quality of higher education, lack of skill development and thus low employment 
prospects in the Indian labour market for all graduates. The Economic Survey (2018–19 and 2019–20) 
points out lower Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER), poor vocational skills, higher drop-out rates and disparity 
in a higher education levels across gender and backward social groups, which confirms the latter 
hypothesis. Further, interacting working-age share with workforce participation rate reveals no 
significance. This is a new and interesting finding as no study has so far checked empirically for this 
interaction effect. This may point to the upcoming danger of demographic burden if sufficient 
employment opportunities are not generated (Bloom et al., 2003 & Bloom, 2011). 
The interaction of the working-age share with three time dummies for the period 1991–95, 2001–05, and 
2011–15 are positive, highly statistically significant and their magnitude increasing linearly for successive 
decades. Finally, in the col. 9 when all the control variables are included (keeping in mind their pairwise 
correlations), the results are quantitatively stable and the statistical significance of interaction term of 
IMR with working-age ratio remains unchanged. The interaction with time dummies highlight that India’s 
window of opportunity started after 2005 and its effect got strengthened during 2011–15, again 
confirming the earlier findings of UNFPA (2019) and James & Goli (2016). The model explains 83% of the 
variations in per capita income, suggesting a goodness of fit of the model. 
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Table 2: Impact of working-age population share on per capita income 
 









FE Model  RE Model FE Model FE Model  RE Model  
Log working-age ratio 4.980*** 5.802*** 7.965*** 7.797*** 3.452*** 4.204*** 4.819*** 0.557 0.636 
 (1.607) (1.131) (1.277) (0.612) (1.062) (1.231) (1.318) (1.020) (0.940) 
Urbanisation       0.048***  0.0467***  0.0188*** 
     (0.00890)  (0.0111)  (0.00712) 
Social sector expenditure     0.00930    0.00738 
     (0.00664)    (0.0134) 
Governance index     0.00558  0.0138   
     (0.0107)  (0.0127)   
Gender development index     2.253***     
    (0.709)     
Gender empowerment 
measure 
     2.787***   0.698 
     (0.553)   (0.748) 
Education institutional 
resources 
     0.0867 0.171  0.262 
     (0.513) (0.502)  (0.261) 
Agriculture/non-agriculture      -0.00294    
     (0.0534)    
Export openness index       0.326   
       (0.473)   
Infrastructure index       0.0314   
       (0.770)   
Log working-age ratio*Log 
infant mortality rate 
       -0.0532** -0.0401* 
       (0.0219) (0.0244) 
Log working-age 
ratio*Graduate share 
       0.00602 0.00217 




       0.00148 0.00153 
       (0.00162) (0.00179) 
          
Log working-age ratio*time        0.0549*** 0.0339 
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dummy    1991–95        (0.0191) (0.0280) 
Log working-age ratio*time 
dummy    2001–05 
       0.125*** 0.0854* 
       (0.0281) (0.0496) 
Log working-age ratio*time 
dummy    2011–15 
       0.229*** 0.153* 
       (0.0504) (0.0909) 
          
Constant -9.902 -13.1*** -21.7*** -21.2*** -6.685* -8.060* -10.51** 8.404* 6.976* 
 (6.484) (4.605) (5.231) (2.467) (3.853) (4.754) (5.055) (4.137) (3.844) 
State dummy     YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 25 25 25 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Groups    25 25 25 25 25 25 
R-squared 0.43 0.69 0.64 0.74 0.74 0.79 0.74 0.77 0.85 
Adjusted R-squared 0.43 0.69 0.64 0.74 0.73 0.78 0.72 0.75 0.83 
Note: The dependent variable is log per capita net state domestic product. Standard errors are robust, clustered at the state level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, 




4.3.3 Estimating the demographic dividend: Conditional Barro regression model 
Table 3 from equation (2) presents the conditional Barro regression model. The baseline specification in 
model 1 brings out the large, positive and statistically significant impact of the initial share of working-age 
population on the per capita income growth. Similar results were found by Thakur (2012). It suggests that 
states having a larger share of working-age population in 1981, particularly the southern states, West 
Bengal, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Punjab (notably these are the leading states in terms of economic 
growth) have a larger impact on the per capita income growth than those states with a smaller share of 
working-age population (which coincides with the laggard states such as Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, 
Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh). The coefficient of the log initial per capita income is negative and 
statistically insignificant, suggesting weak convergence. Surprisingly, the growth in working-age ratio is 
found to have a positive but insignificant impact on per capita income. The study by James (2008) based 
on OLS specification and Joe et al. (2018) also found similar results. However, these studies have not 
controlled for key policy variables. Once we control for urbanisation rate, social sector expenditure and 
governance index in model 2, the coefficient of the growth rate of the working-age population becomes 
statistically significant. To be precise, an increase of 1% in the growth rate of the working-age ratio is 
associated with an increase of 1.9% in average annual per capita income growth, keeping other factors 
constant. In other words, the contribution of the demographic dividend is estimated to be around 1.9 
percentage points out of the 12% average annual growth rate in per capita NSDP during 1981–2015. 
Among covariates, the urbanisation rate also emerges to be a significant determinant of economic growth 
which is in line with the Bloom et al. (2003) and Bloom (2011). 
Models 3 and 4, however, reveal that it is not the growth rate of the working-age ratio but the gender 
empowerment measures and workforce participation rate that determine economic growth. The studies 
by Desai (2010); Bloom et al. (2003) & Bloom (2011) have also argued the same thesis theoretically. To 
check it further, the growth in working-age ratio is interacted with health, education, employment and 
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gender empowerment measures in models 5 and 6. The results from model 5 highlight the positive and 
statistically significant impact of the interaction between the growth in working-age share and workforce 
participation rate on economic growth. This is in line with the argument that demographic changes only 
increase potential labour supply but their gainful and productive employment is crucial to enhance 
economic growth (Bloom, 2011). The interaction coefficient is trivial in magnitude reflecting the present 
status of labour market where half of the workforce is out of the labour market, the widespread presence 
of less productive informal and contractual jobs and less than a quarter of women being active in the 
labour market (Economic Survey, 2018–19 and 2019–20). The results from model 6 also bring to notice 
that demographic dividend could not be reaped automatically without empowering women as shown by 
the interaction of growth in working-age share with gender empowerment measure. This is one of the 
most crucial findings of this study which is, for the first time, empirically tested as a part of eco-
demographic models. Goodness of fit statistics for the model 6 suggest that the model’s explanatory 
power improve significantly with adjusted R-square reaching 65%.
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Table 3: Estimates of demographic dividend from the conditional Barro convergence regression model  
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Log initial working-age ratio 18.57*** 17.30* 12.25*** 14.86** 15.18** 12.09*** 
(5.276) (8.700) (4.008) (5.920) (5.756) (3.421) 
Growth in working-age ratio 1.633 1.860* 0.998 1.241 0.984 0.292 
(1.009) (1.025) (0.632) (1.046) (0.854) (0.620) 
Log initial per capita income -0.194 -0.892 -0.710 -0.341 -0.313 -0.725 
(0.807) (0.932) (0.642) (0.739) (0.739) (0.585) 
Urbanisation    0.0465*     
  (0.0241)     
Social sector expenditure  0.169     
  (0.106)     
Governance index  0.0191     
  (0.0435)     
Gender empowerment measure   6.975***    
   (2.126)    
Education institutional resources   0.454    
  (0.668)    
Agriculture/non-agriculture   0.411     
  (0.456)     
Export openness index  -9.164     
  (6.673)     
Infrastructure index   0.412    
   (1.429)    
Log infant mortality rate     -0.278   
    (0.644)   
Graduate share    0.0451   
    (0.147)   
Workforce participation rate    0.0587*   
    (0.0302)   
Growth in working-age ratio*Log infant 
mortality rate 
    -0.0643  
    (0.162)  
Growth in working-age ratio *Graduate     0.0122  
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share     (0.0408)  
Growth in working-age ratio *Workforce 
participation rate 
    0.0149*  
    (0.00782)  
Growth in working-age ratio*Gender 
empowerment measure  
     1.822*** 
     (0.543) 
Constant -74.65*** -66.27* -44.37** -57.63** -58.31** -40.60*** 
 (17.37) (33.93) (16.18) (26.89) (23.86) (14.21) 
Observations 25 25 25 25 25 25 
R-squared 0.56 0.71 0.72 0.63 0.63 0.70 
Adjusted R-squared 0.50 0.57 0.62 0.51 0.51 0.65 
Note: The dependent variable is growth in per capita net state domestic product (1981–2015). Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, 
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Population-adjusted weighted regression. All control variables are measured at the initial time point (1981). The model does not include 





4.3.4 Robustness checks 
(i) Comparison of demographic dividend estimate relative to other studies  
Comparison of the demographic dividend estimates across the studies is spurious when use different 
number of samples across the geographies, time frameand also varying methods. However, we used the 
approach to show (1) a conservative comparison of consistency in the direction of relationship between 
‘age-structure of population’ and ‘economic growth’ across the studies that used similar models; and (2) 
also to show the relative significance of the present study. Table 4 gives a summary of findings of studies 
based on cross country sample as well as those on state-level panel data of India to make a comparison 
of our results relative to these studies, which are all based on the conditional Barro regression model. 
Though the studies considered for the comparison do differ in terms of their time frame, sample size  and 
control variables, all of them qualitatively gives a common conclusion that ‘age structure of population’ is 
one of the most critical determinants of economic growth, which is consistent with our results. In addition, 
our study empirically supports the argument put forward by other studies that the effect of working-age 
population on economic growth depends on ‘good’ policy environments such as better education and 
health facilities, decent employment opportunities and gender empowerment (Bloom et al. 2003; Bloom 
2011).  
However, the studies that focused explicitly on the state-level panel data of India for assessing 
demographic dividend have rather found a mixed impact of working-age share on economic growth due 
to following reasons (a) most of them (see James, 2008; Aiyar and Mody, 2011; and Kumar, 2013) have 
estimated demographic dividend by considering data from the time frame prior to 2001. However, our 
paper has clearly shown that India’s demographic window of opportunity has begun in 2005–06. Thus, 
there is a less chance to find-out a significant positive association between age-structure and economic 
growth in studies that used the information prior to the onset of demographic window of opportunity for 
a country; (b) studies finding a negative or insignificant effect of growth in the working-age share on 
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economic growth (see Thakur, 2012 and Joe et al., 2018) have not controlled for key policy factors, thus 
found unexpected findings; (c) none of them has checked for the interaction effects to find whether the 
effect of demographic changes is conditioned by the policy framework. Thus, our findings are more robust 
considering the period in which we have tested the hypothesis with a robust empirical approach and 




Table 4: Summary of selected studies based on conditional Barro convergence models 
 
Studies based on cross-
country panel data 





dividend estimate  
Bloom and Williamson, 1998 1965–1990 78 OLS, Table 3, 
spec 1b 
1.46 (0.34) 
Bloom and Sachs, 1998 1965–1990 77 OLS, Table 6, 
spec 3 
1.25 (0.54) 
Bloom, Canning, and 
Malaney, 2000 
1965–1990 391 OLS, Table 2, 
spec 2 
1.27 (0.38) 
Bloom and Canning, 2003 1965–1995 507 OLS, Table 1 0.79 (0.33) 
Bloom and Canning, 2004 1965–1995 507 OLS, Table 1 0.99 (3.06) 
Bloom, Canning, Fink, and 
Finlay, 2007 
1960–2000 610 OLS, Table 2, 
spec 1 
0.80 (2.94) 
Bloom and Finlay, 2008 1960–2005 565 OLS, Table 4, 
spec 2 
1.75 (0.27) 
Bloom, Canning, Hu, Liu, 
Mahal, and Yip, 2010 
1960–2000 647 OLS, Table 5, 
spec 2 
0.87 (0.27) 
Drummond, Thakoor, and Yu, 
2014 
1960–2010 1100 FE, Table 2, spec 
1 
0.53 (3.75) 

















James, 2008 1971–2001 60 OLS, Table 4, 
spec 1 




Aiyar and Mody, 2011 1961–2001 76 OLS, Table 4, 
spec 1 
2.48 (1.03) 
Thakur, 2012 1981–2011 41 OLS, Table 5, 
spec 2 
-0.02 (0.94) 
Kumar, 2013 1971–2001 48 OLS, Table 2, 
spec 1 
2.72 (1.16) 









(ii) Relative contribution of the working-age share in the per capita income inequality: Regression-
based inequality decomposition model 
In this method, first, an income-generating function is set as ln(𝑦𝑖) =  α + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑘𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖  + ε                                                                                                                                     (3) 
where 𝑦𝑖  is per capita income for i=1,….,k,. 𝑥𝑖  is a vector of explanatory variable. 𝛽𝑖 are the corresponding 
regression coefficients that are estimated by OLS regression and 𝜀 is the residual term, assumed to be 
unrelated to other variables.  ln(𝑦𝑖) =  α + ∑ 𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑖=1 + ε                                                                                                                                      
where each 𝑍𝑖  for i=1,….,k,. is a `composite' variable, equal to the product of an estimated regression 
coefficient and an explanatory variable. To calculate inequality decomposition, the value of α is not relevant 
as it is constant for every observation. Thus, one may consider the following equation ln(𝑦𝑖 )̂ =  α + ∑ 𝑍𝑖𝑘𝑖=1                                                                                                                                 
where dependent variable is 𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑎𝑡 or predicted income variable. Note, there is no residual term and we can 
neglect the constant term α. 
Then following Shorrocks (1982), Fields & Yoo (2000) and, Fields (2003), the contribution of each 
composite variable to total per capita income inequality can be assessed as follows: 𝜎 2(y) = ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑘𝑖=1 cov(y, 𝑥𝑖) +  𝜎 2(ε)                                                                                                                                           (4) 
where, 𝜎 2(y) is the variance of y, cov(y, 𝑥𝑖) represents the covariance of y with each variable (𝑥𝑖) and this 
term can be considered as the relative contribution of the factor components to total per capita income 
inequality which sums up to 100%. 
Appendix Table A2 reports three different models of pooled OLS regression from equation (3) based on 
the correlation among the explanatory variables. Table 5 from equation (4) reveals that around one-fourth 
of the income inequality is contributed by the working-age share across states, after controlling other core 
policy variables, reassuring the significance of the working-age population in determining per capita 
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income. Other important variables significantly contributing to inequality is the graduate share, gender 
empowerment measure, gender development index, urbanisation rate, export openness index, log infant 




Table 5: Estimates of regression-based inequality decomposition model—Contribution of variation in 
working-age population share to inequality in per capita NSDP 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Log working-age ratio  27.63*** 25.39*** 17.81*** 
Urbanisation   19.53*** 13.81***  
Social sector expenditure 3.99** 3.66* 0.96 
Governance index  8.54*** 9.66*** 
Gender development index 16.09***   
Gender empowerment measure  30.98***  
Education institutional resources 0.17 0.29  
Agriculture/non-agriculture  1.79  
Export openness index 18.95***  8.28*** 
Infrastructure index  2.03 0.85 
Log infant mortality rate   12.04** 
Graduate share   32.27*** 
Workforce participation rate   8.19*** 
Residual 13.64 13.47 9.94 
Total 100 100 100 
Note: The dependent variable is log per capita net state domestic product. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Population-adjusted weighted regression. The pooled OLS regression of 






(iii) Checking endogeneity of the working-age share: Instrumental variable model 
 
As discussed previously in the empirical specification section, the working-age share may be an 
endogenous variable (Bloom & Williamson, 1998; Bloom & Canning, 2003; Bloom & Canning, 2004; Bloom 
et al., 2010; Bloom, 2011; Drummond, et al., 2014). Its endogeneity is assessed by instrumenting it with 
gender development index, workforce participation rate, graduate share and infrastructure index. The 
instruments selected are in line with the theoretical argument that the impact of working-age share on 
per capita income should work through the channels of education, employment, health, lower gender 
bias and availability of infrastructure (Bloom et al., 2003; Bloom, 2011). The statistical expression for the 
model is as follows: 
 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  = α + 𝛽0 ( 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 =𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 ,𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡) +   𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  + 𝑢𝑖𝑡.                                                     (5) 
 
where 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  is the dependent variable. 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 is the instrumented 
variable. Other explanatory variables have usual interpretation. 
The 2SLS estimates from equation (5) presented in Table 6 suggest the statistical significant bearing of 
working-age share on per capita income when instrumented by gender development index, workforce 
participation rate, graduate share and infrastructure index, controlling for other variables, time dummy 
and state dummy. A 1% rise in the working-age share leads to a rise in per capita income by 5.8% in col.3. 
The working-age share is an endogenous variable as, under the endogeneity test, the null hypothesis of 
the exogeneity of the working-age share is rejected at a conventional level of significance. The instruments 
used are valid as per the test of over-identifying restrictions and the value of F-statistic shows that 
instruments are not weekly correlated with the endogenous regressors.  
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Table 6: Estimates from instrumental variables model (2SLS) 
Variable Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
Log working-age ratio  3.037*** 5.962*** 5.803*** 
 (1.133) (1.475) (1.786) 
Urbanisation   0.0175**   
 (0.00785)   
Social sector expenditure -0.0284***   
 (0.00985)   
Governance index  -0.0215***  
  (0.00681)  
Education institutional resources  0.0476  
  (0.270)  
Agriculture/non-agriculture   0.113* 
   (0.0682) 
Export openness index  0.242 0.744* 
  (0.263) (0.407) 
Log infant mortality rate  -0.383* -0.448* 
  (0.227) (0.254) 
Time dummy YES YES YES 
State dummy  YES YES YES 
Constant -2.449 -12.18** -11.57* 
 (4.490) (5.638) (6.858) 
Observations 100 100 100 
Groups 25 25 25 
First-stage F statistic 10.61 11.66 12.38 
Over-identifying restrictions (Ho: zero correlation between instruments and the error term) 
Sargan chi2   3.21455 (p = 0.3597) 6.35509 (p = 0.0956) 8.09886 (p = 0.0540) 
Exogeneity of instrumented explanatory variable (Ho: Variable is exogenous) 
Robust score  
Robust regression  
7.11173 (p = 0.0077) 
4.56755 (p = 0.0362) 
18.2902 (p = 0.0000) 
14.126 (p = 0.0004) 
11.0987 (p = 0.0009) 
9.07023 (p = 0.0037) 
Note: The dependent variable is log per capita net state domestic product. Robust standard errors are given in 













5 Challenges in the way of realising demographic dividend 
The empirical analysis highlights the importance of education, health, employment, lower gender bias, 
high level of urbanisation and several other crucial policy factors in determining demographic dividend 
for India. However, several lacunae in these areas act as a hindrance in India’s way of realising the 
demographic dividend. These shortcomings have been identified with the help of our empirical findings, 
which are again corroborated by findings of previous studies.   
First and foremost is the abysmal level of public investments in social infrastructure (James, 2008; 2011; 
Oxfam India Report, 2018). The total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP is less than 2% while 
the global average is around 6%. Despite a tremendous improvement in health indicators, the health-
adjusted life expectancy (HALE) at birth in India is only 59.3 years as per WHO (2016) estimate. On the 
education front, though there is remarkable progress in India’s Gross Enrolment Ratio in the primary and 
secondary level, it is significantly lower in higher education (26.3% in 2018–19 as per MHRD provisional 
data, cited in economic Survey 2018–19). Also, there is a disparity in higher education levels across gender 
and backward social groups. The literacy rate has touched 77% mark in 2017–18 (PLFS Annual report 2017-
18), but the learning outcomes are still miserable. The Annual Status of Education Report (2018) highlights 
that 1 out of 4 children leaving class 8 lack basic reading skills. The quality of the workforce depicted by 
its skill profile is also gloomy. As per the PLFS Annual Report (2017–18), only 2.26% of the people in the 
productive age group (15–59 years) received formal vocational training.  
Second, as per the PLFS Annual Report (2017–18), around half of the working-age population in India is 
out of the labour market. Further, there is a worsening of the quality of employment due to the growing 
informalisation and casualisation of jobs. One cannot ignore the other half of the demographic dividend 
that is the status of women in the sphere of education, health and labour market. The female LFPR in India 
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is one of the lowest in the world and less than a quarter of them were active in the labour market in 2017–
18. [see CPC 2006; Desai 2010] 
Another constraint is the negative trend in household savings rate which is a principal source of capital 
accumulation and an important parameter of demographic dividend (Economic Survey, 2018-19). Besides 
this, according to Oxfam India Report (2018), India has the highest disparity among all the nations of the 
world on all the parameters of income, wealth and consumption. This rising income disparity may further 
dampen the consumption levels in the future, thereby affecting the demand in the market. Lastly, the 
level of urbanisation in India is around 34% in 2018 but there is a vast interstate disparity (U.N. World 
Urbanisation Prospects, 2018). This rapid pace of urbanisation due to non-availability of adequate and 
quality non-farm employment in rural areas has put excessive population pressure in cities leading 
unhealthy living environment, greater pollution levels and disease burden (Bloom et al., 2010; Bloom, 
2011; James & Goli, 2016).  
The next upcoming issue emerging from the age structure transition of the population is the rapidly 
growing old-age dependency ratio with a greater disease and disabilities in the future (Economic Survey, 
2018-19). According to Goli & Pandey’s (2010) estimates based on UN projections, there will be only a 2% 
increase in the working-age population in the 2005–2050 period, whereas the size of the older population 
will increase by 13% during the same period. Moreover, in India, the older population doubles in only 25 
years, which is in stark contrast to the US where it takes around 70 years for this doubling (James & Goli, 
2016). Thus, India will prematurely develop into ageing societies which will have serious economic and 
health burdens unless it acts against it (see Japan’s case study in Bloom, Canning, & Sevilla, 2003). There 
is a possibility of the ‘Second Demographic Dividend’ for the country (Ladusingh & Narayana, 2011), but 
it hinges on the healthy and financially literate older population, with adequate availability of developed 
financial markets, income and social security measures, which at present seems to be an arduous task in 
India (Bloom, 2011; James & Goli, 2016; Goli, Reddy A, James & Srinivasan, 2019). Therefore, India should 
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start preparing for this future challenge; otherwise it may get old before getting rich, despite the observed 
demographic bonus. 
 
6. Conclusions  
India’s demographic window of opportunity began in 2005, while the demographic dividend effect got 
strengthened in 2011–15 and the country will continue to have demographic bonus until 2061. The 
demographic dividend is estimated to be about 1.9 percentage points per annum for the period 1981–
2015 based on the panel of 25 states of India, after controlling core policy variables. The relative 
proportion contribution of working-age population is estimated to be around one-fourth of the income 
inequality across states over time, reassuring its significance in determining per capita income. However, 
empirical estimation based on the interaction effects and instrumental variable model reveals that healthy 
workforce, productive employment, higher education level, better infrastructure and empowerment of 
women is quintessential for better realisation of the demographic dividend of India. Further extending 
this logic and also based on the insights from the literature, we put forward some of the major lacunae in 
reaping the desired benefits of demographic change as dwindling spending on education and health 
sector, poor quality of learning, skill mismatches, the presence of chronic illnesses and disabilities, falling 
employment rates, gender disparities (in education, health, labour market and overall sex ratio), child 
marriage, falling household savings rate, urbanisation of rural poverty and rapidly rising ageing population 
(Bloom, 2011; James & Goli, 2016; Goli, Reddy A, James & Srinivasan, 2019). Besides, given the fact that 
there exist huge inter-state variations in socio-economic and demographic profiles, the realisation of 
demographic dividend is conditional on the performance of northern states where the window of 
opportunity has just begun and these states typically underperform in growth correlates compared to 
other Indian states (Oxfam India Report, 2018; Economic Survey, 2018-19). Therefore, prompt policy 
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nce GDI GEM EIR 
Agriculture/n
on-agriculture EOI Infra IMR Grad WPR 
Log PCY 1.00                           
Log WAR 0.81 1.00                         
Urban 0.57 0.49 1.00                       
SSE 0.19 0.19 -0.32 1.00                     
Governance  0.01 0.01 0.13 0.12 1.00                   
GDI 0.59 0.60 0.19 0.33 -0.21 1.00                 
GEM 0.78 0.67 0.47 0.02 0.06 0.40 1.00               
EIR 
-
0.14 -0.11 0.08 -0.41 0.02 -0.37 0.19 1.00             
Agri/non-agri 
-
0.54 -0.65 -0.56 0.02 -0.05 -0.43 -0.44 0.09 1.00           
EOI 0.45 0.41 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.24 0.34 -0.08 -0.28 1.00         
Infra 0.27 0.20 0.71 -0.57 0.06 -0.20 0.43 0.55 -0.35 0.04 1.00       
IMR 
-
0.63 -0.67 -0.35 -0.33 -0.14 -0.62 -0.41 0.39 0.47 -0.25 0.11 1.00     
Grad 0.74 0.68 0.82 -0.02 0.20 0.33 0.58 -0.10 -0.60 0.33 0.47 -0.55 1.00   
WPR 0.32 0.34 -0.06 0.46 -0.17 0.43 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.25 -0.24 -0.22 0.12 1.00 
Note: PCY stands for per capita income; WAR, working-age ratio; SSE, social sector expenditure; GDI, gender development index; GEM, gender empowerment measure; EIR, 
education institutional resources; EOI, export openness index; Infra, infrastructure; IMR, infant mortality rate; Grad, graduate share; and WPR, workforce participation rate. 
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Table A2: Pooled OLS regression–based decomposition of inequality in per capita income  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Log working-age ratio 2.892*** 2.658*** 1.865*** 
 (0.720) (0.823) (0.649) 
Urbanisation   0.0159*** 0.0113***  
 (0.00322) (0.00368)  
Social sector expenditure 0.0181** 0.0166* 0.00436 
 (0.00746) (0.00862) (0.00647) 
Governance index  -0.0239*** -0.0271*** 
  (0.00673) (0.00576) 
Gender development index 1.071***   
 (0.308)   
Gender empowerment measure  2.183***  
  (0.453)  
Education institutional resources -0.0537 -0.0992  
 (0.126) (0.158)  
Agriculture/non-agriculture  -0.0226  
  (0.0596)  
Export openness index 2.436***  1.065*** 
 (0.386)  (0.378) 
Infrastructure index  0.363 0.151 
  (0.385) (0.289) 
Log infant mortality rate    -0.191** 
   (0.0778) 
Graduate share   0.108*** 
   (0.0191) 
Workforce participation rate   0.0157*** 
   (0.00499) 
Constant -2.935 -1.554 2.728 
 (2.724) (3.300) (2.722) 
Observations 100 100 100 
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.90 
Note: The dependent variable is log per capita net state domestic product. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Population-adjusted weighted regression. 
